Allow the Tribe DAO to vote-lock the BAL owned by their protocol into veBAL, and participate in governance on the Balancer DAO.
Motivation
The Tribe DAO currently holds the equivalent of ~270k BAL, which could be used in Balancer’s governance (see FIP-92 vote). This BAL comes partly from the treasury swap performed with the Balancer DAO in November 2021, and partly from BAL rewards earned in the liquidity mining program since then.
The Tribe DAO has a privileged relationship with the Balancer DAO (Turbo, Buybacks, Fuse Pool, and more to come), and vote-locking the protocol’s BAL seems like a logical next step.
Risks
The smart-contract used to vote-lock B-80BAL-20WETH into veBAL is immutable, and does not tokenize the deposits. It doesn’t do anything that an externally-owned account couldn’t do. Therefore, the risks are minimal.
Unlike auraBAL and tetuBAL, the Tribe DAO’s locker does not tokenize veBAL, and only does what an EoA would do, so whitelisting should be pretty non-controversial.
This would allow the Tribe DAO to be in for week 2 of rewards (starting in 4d14h), and able to vote on snapshots for these 2 other whitelisting requests
Thanks for the proposal @Eswak! Great to see Tribe locking all this BAL =)
Though I’m a big fan of Tribe and definitely support this, I would advise against pushing it too fast to a snapshot vote before the community had the chance to take a proper look at it first.
It’s clear that the SC won’t be able to tokenize veBAL so that makes everything more straightforward, but any allowlisting proposals have IMO to be very well discussed before votes happen. We don’t want to set a precedent for other proposals to be pushed too fast to snapshot in the future.
I’ve had a quick look at the contracts and it seems that while a tokenisation layer could be built around the VeBalDelegatorPCVDeposit, it would be impossible to remove Tribe DAO’s ability to unilaterally withdraw any staked LP deposits. Considering this “flaw”, it’s unlikely that such a tokenisation layer would be made.
@Eswak The VeBalDelegatorPCVDeposit contract is written with the assumption that if Balancer moves to an onchain voting system it would conform to the IMetagovGovernor interface. It’s relatively likely that any future onchain voting contract would support this interface but we don’t have any concrete plans around this at this time so we can’t guarantee it. If not then Tribe DAO would have to allow their lock to expire and migrate to a new contract to be able to vote.
Yes, it’s a bet that a future on-chain governor will either be compatible with OZ Governor or Governor Bravo. Unfortunately that’s the best we can do, because there are no concrete plans / specs for the Balancer DAO to have an on-chain governor yet. As devs, we took the bet that the Balancer DAO will use a compatible interface with one of these 2 standards, because that will allow to benefit from existing toolings (like withtally.com for instance). But no guarantee for sure. Losing voting power for 1 year while the DAO waits for its voting power to expire would be a pretty bad outcome, let’s hope this does not happen.
Can you explain a bit more what you mean ?
Thanks for the heads up, I was looking at this post for governance voting delays.
Yep, I’d say it’s a relatively safe bet as we’re not looking to reinvent the wheel but I thought I’d flag it up anyway.
I mean should Tribe DAO wish to spin this contract off as a tokenised form of veBAL, you could expose a PCV controller which is restricted to only be able to interact with this PCV deposit and contains the tokenisation logic.
The trouble with that solution is Tribe DAO maintains full custody over all veBAL and gauge deposits placed into this contract so it’s impossible to make it trustless. With this caveat it’s not really an attractive proposition for others to lock veBAL into it and so Balancer doesn’t need to be concerned.
