Summary:
TETU has recently deployed its v2 on Base and wants to use Balancer as a primary source of liquidity for its tUSDbC token. The main reasons are the high reliability of the Balancer protocol and the ease of development and attract liquidity on balancer
Tetu is an asset management protocol that implements automated yield farming strategy for users
Motivation:
We want to enable our tUSDbC pool gauge and provide emissions and bribes towards it to attract liquidity
Specifications:
Governance: Multi Sig - Tetu
Oracles: No
Audits: docs.tetu.io
Centralization Vectors: n/a
Market History: tUSDbC is a stablecoin backed token and can be redeemed for 1:1
1: The tetuBAL LP pool is currently the worst performing pool on Balancer based on emissions paid vs fees earned.
2: The TETU/USDC pool is also near the bottom of the list.
3: tUSDc appears to be fully redeeemable, so this does not seem to be a pool that seeks to provide needed liquditiy, but more a way to increase yields on Tetu’s USDC vault using BAL emissions. There was no mention of any trading history in the market history section above.
4: Using a weighted pool for correlated tokens with no rate provider instead of a stableswap both creates less liquidity and produces less fees for Balancer.
As it stands between 15-20% of all BAL emissions are going to Tetu pools with almost no volume or activity. Further, a large number of these yields are being farmed by Tetu themsleves, and dumped for profit.
I do not support additional vote weight for Tetu. I do not support additional pools for Tetu unless one of the following is true:
1: The addition comes with a change to caps of other tetu pools that results in less total vote weight being directed to these low fee/low volume pools operated by tetu.
2: Tetu presents a plan that shows how they are using a majority of the emissions they are farming to build in a way that is constructive to a healthy veBAL ecosystem.
Maybe I am missing something. If what Balancer governance cares about is Volume, Revenue and Positive Attention, how does this proposal and/or Tetu’s presence as a major recepient of BAL emissions help the DAO improve these KPIs?
First of all, can we be reviewed by somebody except @Tritium?
This person is very emotional, multiple times uses hate speech and FUD in our direction. I do not think his opinion will be positive regarding any of our products.
Please, show that your project does not have to belong to Tritium, I hope it is not the only person who is responsible for all questions.
However, answer to your points:
How we will provide something valuable if any new product stops at the initial stage with the reason that our old one is bad? Give us a chance.
I do not know what the connection between TETU/USDC and brand new product on new network.
Our V2 vaults, such as tUSDbC on Base and tUSDC on Polygon has deposit/withdraw fees. For small users, it is easier and cheaper for them buy/sell on some DEX instead of deposit/redeem.
Moreover, we are ready to place real bribes from underlying income to attract liquidity. This bribes increase Balancer ecosystem healthy and give additional income for veBAL holder.
Technically this solution is a replacement for Balancer boosted pools.
We created Composable Stable Pool, am I doing something wrong or misunderstanding your point?
We can not predict volumes for a new product. Probably with a more friendly environment the volume will be higher
I will be glad to launch our new product on Balancer DEX.
I will be glad to have even microcap 0.1% just not sure it is technically possible.
We already decreased the capacity for tetuBAL pool and changed A factor as you suggested.
What should we do more?
This tUSDbC asset is not supposed to be held by one majority holder.
There is no risk of being whitelisted and seated by only 1 holder and grabbing all emissions.
All reasons against look very political and personally motivated.
They are not anyhow correlated to this new product.
Can you explain a bit more about tUSDbC, if i understand correclty its fully 1:1 redeemable with USDbc, aside from an entry and exit fee. The reason a person would want tUSDbC is because tetu’s management of a user’s USDbC is yielding them a return from various yield farming strategies. Is that right? Just trying to understand why user’s would choose to mint tUSDbC aside from to farm BAL. I am mainly wondering if this asset can be wrapped so yield can taken from the tUSDbC strategy and sent through the core pool cycle. This would make more sense from a revenue perspective for the DAO and tie it closer to the overall ecosystem with veBAL voters benefitting.
The place Tritium’s concerns come from I think is valid. Tetu receives a large portion of emissions now, and there are other pools which would benefit the DAO more from increased incentives in terms of sustainability. I do not think he is singling you out in particular, we have many pools which fit this mold. All of which the DAO should want to improve.
We are building a product for farming CAAM like uni3/4 pool.
It is a very complex strategy and requires mandatory fees that go to the “insurance”.
To make it possible to enter and exit little users, AND more importantly, make the product highlight for higher auditory, we are placing rewards from shares in a pool as some kind of reward for the pool.
The bribe framework is a great opportunity not only to achieve both these goals but also to get some extra rewards.
But these extra rewards are not our main goal, we have more than enough rewards.
What we really need is a place to attract new auditory.
In this situation, we can find a win-win solution.
We are not going to Balancer to get “extra” rewards. We need your support and some love from your users.
And we are ready to provide a good service.
Again, it is not about bribes. If you want we can send rewards in a gauge directly, send them to DAO, or anything else.
If the case is more of a win for Tetu to do direct incentives, then a gauge proposal would not be necessary. I personally think the best case would be wrapping the token to accrue yield, using a rate provider to pair wtUSDbC with USDbC. Then LPs would retain a portion of the yield, and the core pool cycle would benefit the DAO, and LPs by directing BAL to the gauge consistently. I would support a gauge for that yield bearing liquidity as is. Either path seems ok to me, but adding this specific gauge to the controller as is might make more sense after a few weeks of direct incentives to churn up some liquidity and volume stats.
No need to wrap tUSDbC
Our vault has both mechanic - compounding and claimable rewards.
Users vote for the ratio of them.
In the described case, our users can change the ratio to higher rewards part.
Then, we will able to redirect claimable rewards from shares in the Balancer vault to any place.
We will be glad to send them to Balancer DAO in exchange for support and some core bribes.
From what I read above, you are looking to get more deposits in your pool and use Balancer as a front door of sorts. We’re also looking to build more TVL, core pools and relevant, ecosystem supporting projects on Base. There is a way we can make this work.
A good core pool on Base would be a interest bearing USD vault that compounded 100% of it’s rewards and used a rate provider to pay 50% yield fees.
Due to the lack of core pools on base, and assuming decent fee generation, this pool would likely receive additional vote incentives from fees collected on non-core pools on Base. Assuming it was found to be trrustworthy by users, it could easily scale to be a real cornerstone of our base deployment.
The lack of documentation and clarity around how yields are paid, and the flexibility granted to governance makes it less attractive. Also the current pool is not configured with a rate provider/will not work well if the price per share of tUSDbC increases.
Any chance the Tetu community could agree to turn this into a 100% autocompounder and make this behaviour immutable or otherwise enshrined in a way that it will not change? Then we could build such a pool with a rate provider. If not maybe it makes more sense to use direct incentives as this pool doesn’t fit well into the core pool framework.
Better docs that explain how this pool works and a link to some kind of audit or external review by security professionals would also make it much more trustworthy and likely to scale.
This is an example of why it’s generally a bit harder to work with your products and assess risks. The strategy looks complicated and seems to be controlled by Tetu in the sense that we cannot guarantee that you suddenly decide to change parameters (lack of docs doesn’t help).
Also in regards to the „emotional“ responses from Tritium: he has pointed out very valid concerns that resonates with me as well. I remember that when we suggested the A factor change for the tetu gauge you guys didn’t seem to care. Full discussions can be reviewed here: [RFC]: Mitigation of potential risks associated with TetuBAL Stable Pool settings
Only a power play by humpy made you switch strategies AFAIK. So it’s not like you tried to work with us in the past unfortunately.
I honor that you want to build cool products on top of Balancer but as it stands another risky pool with no clear guard rails is not something I can vote for.
I hope we can find a solution. Currently, the only proper way for a gauge in my opinion is a rate provider implementation like for most LST pools.
Please refer to our documentation and consult example rate providers like for wstETH: Rate Providers | Balancer
Also please note that after your rate provider has been implemented, we need to review it. Currently, Three rocks does these reviews. Their review repository is a good resource on checking other project implementations: https://github.com/threerocks-defi/code-review/tree/main/rate-providers
The Maxis will be happy to help you in this process.
