TL;DR
- I propose an orderly winddown of Balancer: no new business development, a phased sunset of the protocol with a defined exit window, and the DAO closed to the extent legally and practically possible.
- The treasury goes to BAL holders in kind and pro rata, after setting aside what the winddown still needs to spend, in two rounds and a final sweep. Round one opens at the end of May 2027: holders burn their BAL and receive their share of the treasury. Round two is an airdrop to the addresses that redeemed in round one, in proportion to what they redeemed, within two months of the close: the unspent budget, what arrived since, and the share not redeemed. A final sweep six months later distributes anything that arrives after that, to the same addresses.
- The treasury is at least $9M at current token prices, the managed treasury reported by kpk; other DAO addresses and positions are being inventoried and published before round one. The figure that counts is measured and audited at the block round one opens. BAL, and anything that resolves into BAL, is excluded, other than the BAL that goes to tetuBAL holders. The BIP-919 buyback is cancelled.
- Contributor notice runs to 31 October 2026. Pools move to withdrawals only, where the contracts allow it, on 30 October 2026.
- This vote approves the direction, the timeline, what happens to what the DAO owns beyond the treasury, the distribution of the treasury to BAL holders including every allocation rule below, a winddown budget of $150k from 1 November 2026 to May 2027, $30k from then to the final sweep, and a reserve of $220k drawn only if needed, replacing the remaining BIP-918 allocation from that date. It also cancels the BIP-919 buyback and supersedes BIP-687.
- Spending to 31 October, including the contributor notice, runs under BIP-918 and is not part of this vote. What is left of that allocation is not carried over as a new budget: it is spent down against the winddown budget below, and whatever remains returns to the treasury.
- The mechanism that implements the distribution is published as an implementation specification, for comment, not for a vote. Transferring anything the DAO owns beyond the treasury, such as code, licences or deployments, gets its own Snapshot vote. Any change to an allocation rule comes back to a vote.
Motivation
Balancer tried. In April, token holders approved a plan to take the protocol to profitability on a restructured base: costs cut, emissions ended, the token model simplified, protocol revenue routed to the DAO, growth expected from v3. They backed it, and the team executed it. v3 is live and operating as designed. Boosted Pools remain a category Balancer defined. AutoRange Pools shipped, the product expected to get us there. New integrations and partnerships were pursued throughout. Some generated interest. None converted into sustained revenue growth. Key people left or stepped back over that period, and the plan ran with less than it was designed with.
The revenue picture is why this comes now. Most of the protocol’s revenue still comes from v2. v3 revenue has not grown to replace it. BIP-918 set a review for exactly this case. This proposal is that review, brought early. Waiting for the calendar would change the numbers, not the conclusion, and every month of waiting is spent from the treasury.
The November 2025 exploit hit legacy v2 pools. v3 is a different architecture, but the event followed the name into every conversation since and made traction harder to build. It is part of why the plan was harder than it looked in April; it is not what this rests on. With a working product suite, a lean structure and full effort from everyone who stayed, the traction the plan required did not come. I do not see a funded path that changes this picture.
Continuing on the current path spends the treasury to arrive at the same place later. That treasury belongs to BAL holders. The question is whether what remains reaches holders while it is still substantial, or is spent first on a path that has already been tried.
Specification
This vote approves the following package. Communication changes from this post; winddown actions wait for the vote.
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The protocol sunsets in phases. The contracts are non custodial: withdrawing does not depend on Balancer or on anyone continuing to operate. Every step is announced before it happens.
- Exit window, from this post. Documentation for withdrawing directly from the contracts, and through third party tools that already support it, is published in this window.
- Withdrawals only, on 30 October 2026. This proposal is the notice: six weeks ahead. On that date, pools that can be paused are paused and move to withdrawals only. Where a pool’s contracts require it, recovery mode is enabled on the same date so withdrawals stay open. Pools differ; the treatment of each is published before that date. Pools that cannot be paused keep working as they are, with the protocol fee set to zero where the contracts allow it. The point of both is the same: after that date the protocol does not depend on Balancer operating it. The frontend, routing and communication treat everything as discontinued.
- Minimal infrastructure. From 1 November, infrastructure steps down to a simplified withdrawal interface, the subgraph coverage it needs and public documentation, kept available, including the veBAL unlock path, until the veBAL locks expire and through both distribution rounds.
- Permission cleanup. Admin permissions, multisig roles and remaining privileged access, including the mainnet DAO multisig and the Emergency subDAO, are inventoried, then revoked or transferred as each becomes safe to retire. Permissions relevant to veBAL unlocks are retired only after the end of May 2027; control of the treasury and the distribution contracts only after the distribution process ends. The end state is a protocol that needs no one from Balancer: the DAO gives up its own privileged roles. Roles that cannot be removed are inventoried and published.
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Contributor notice and winddown budget. Contributors were given two months of notice on 27 August, running to 31 October, a management decision within the approved budget. Spending to 31 October, including the notice, runs under BIP-918 and is not part of this vote. From 1 November, this proposal’s winddown budget applies: $150k to May 2027, $30k from then to the final sweep, and a reserve of $220k drawn only if needed. It replaces the remaining BIP-918 allocation from that date and is a cap, not a transfer: what is already funded at the OpCo is spent first, and only the balance is drawn. A small transition team on an hourly basis, sized to what the winddown needs, does the remaining work, coordinated by the OpCo. Whatever is not spent returns to the treasury and goes into the distribution.
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What the DAO owns beyond the treasury. Code, licences, deployments and the like are disposed of by governance, each transfer through its own Snapshot vote. Nothing is handed to anyone by default. Value realized from any of it flows to the treasury. What belongs to the DAO and what sits with the legal entities is established before any such vote. Existing obligations to counterparties are honored through the transition or wound down explicitly with each of them, not dropped. Whatever finds no operator stays open source, with documentation and archives published.
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The BIP-919 buyback and the BIP-687 earmark. BIP-919 committed the DAO to a voluntary BAL buyback at NAV, capped at 35% of the treasury at that Snapshot, opening twelve months after it. This proposal cancels that buyback and replaces it with the distribution in item 7. The veBAL compensation in the April package was paid in May under BIP-920 and is not affected. BIP-687 ring fences $1M USDC for the bug bounty program. This proposal supersedes it: the earmark is released when coverage ends and the reports open at that date are resolved.
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Bug bounty. Coverage runs through the exit window and ends on 30 October 2026, the withdrawals only date. A separate proposal, running in parallel, adjusts the critical severity cap for the remaining period; it is not part of this vote.
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Consolidation before round one. Funds in other DAO wallets and sources, including operational safes and fee collection wallets, are consolidated into the Treasury Safe. Open receivables and unclaimed positions in the DAO’s name are recovered. The base reflects everything the DAO holds and is owed, net of what belongs to others, not only what sits in one safe today.
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Treasury distribution. This vote decides it. In kind, in the tokens actually held, pro rata, in two rounds.
- Base: measured at the opening snapshot, the block at which round one opens, announced at least two weeks ahead, and audited. The treasury is at least $9M, estimated at current token prices. That is the managed treasury reported by kpk, the DAO’s treasury manager. The DAO holds further assets across other addresses, wallets and positions on several chains; those are being inventoried, and the full list is published before round one. The figure moves with prices, costs until then, funds confirmed as belonging to third parties, and recoveries. Positions are moved into yield bearing forms where possible until round one, so the treasury keeps earning, and holders receive what is held at the snapshot. kpk proposes the changes under its existing mandate; the Treasury Council approves and signs. BAL, and anything that resolves into BAL, is not a distributable asset.
- Shares: pro rata over circulating supply as BIP-919 defined it: total supply minus the BAL the treasury holds directly or in positions, and minus the BLabs Vesting Safe and the BLabs Fundraise Safe. Both eligibility and the denominator are fixed at the opening snapshot. BAL that leaves an excluded address after it is not redeemable, other than the BAL distributed to tetuBAL holders below.
- Round one opens at the end of May 2027. By then every veBAL lock that exists today has expired, whether held directly or through auraBAL and sdBAL. tetuBAL is handled below. A lock extended after this post is the holder’s choice; it redeems when it unlocks, within the window or not at all. The claim window runs six months, to the end of November 2027. Redeeming burns the BAL; the claim contract records each address and the amount it redeemed, and that record is the basis for round two. Round one distributes the bulk of the treasury. What is retained is the unspent winddown budget and whatever is not redeemed within the window, which stays in the claim contract and is distributed in round two.
- veBAL unlocks into 80/20 BAL/WETH BPT. The pool stays exitable throughout; holders exit to BAL and redeem.
- Wrapper protocols run their own claim calendars. A holder who has not unwound to BAL by the close of round one does not redeem.
- tetuBAL is an immutable permalock; it never becomes BAL. Both the holder set and the amount are fixed at the block of this post: holders of record at that block, and the BAL behind each tetuBAL measured at that block, so neither can be moved afterwards. When round one opens, tetuBAL holders receive BAL equivalent to half of the measured amount from the treasury, and can redeem it in the same window as any other holder, counted in the denominator like any other circulating BAL. This is the one case where treasury BAL is distributed rather than excluded.
- Round two is an airdrop to the addresses that redeemed in round one, in proportion to the BAL each redeemed, within two months of the close: the unspent budget, what has arrived since (fees earned before the pause and collected after it, revenue from pools that keep running, recovered receivables, returned funds), and the share not redeemed in round one. No claim is needed and nothing is transferable: an address that did not redeem in round one has no share in round two. Round two assets may be consolidated before distribution if that materially reduces the cost.
- A final sweep follows, six months after round two, on a date fixed in advance. Whatever has arrived by then is distributed to the same addresses in the same proportion, consolidated first if that reduces the cost. The process ends there.
- Nothing is paid out before round one. The distribution starts once the winddown budget is funded and set aside; whatever is not spent goes back into the distribution.
- The mechanism that implements this, the claim contract, the snapshots and the distributions, is published on the forum as an implementation specification by February 2027, for comment. The claim contract is audited before round one. Anything that would change an allocation comes back to a vote.
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Funds recovered from the attacks on the protocol. They belong to the LPs of the affected pools. They are outside the treasury and outside this distribution, and this proposal does not change how those funds are allocated, which stays as governance approved it. Some of these funds sit in DAO controlled addresses; they are identified and excluded when the full list is published.
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Recovery from the attacks continues. The investigations continue with private investigators and law enforcement. Anything recovered goes to the affected LPs, not to the treasury. The Balancer Foundation carries this work, overseen by the Treasury Council, until the entities close. Who carries it after that, and on what terms, is decided by its own Snapshot vote before the Foundation closes.
This proposal covers the technical detail at the level a decision needs. Pool by pool, chain by chain, there is more of it, and some of it will only be settled as the inventory is finished. The same applies to the legal entities and the order of their closure. Ask in this thread and I will answer, and the team stays available for questions and support through the exit window and beyond it.
What this means for each group
LPs. Your funds stay withdrawable; withdrawing does not depend on Balancer operating. Plan your exit during the window. On 30 October 2026, pools that can be paused are paused and move to withdrawals only; the rest keep working, with the protocol fee set to zero where the contracts allow it. Withdrawal paths through the interface, third party tools and the contracts directly are documented before that date.
BAL holders. You decide this. If it passes, the BIP-919 buyback does not run. From the end of May 2027 you have six months to redeem: you burn your BAL and receive your pro rata share of the treasury in kind. Round two goes to the address you redeemed from, in proportion to what you redeemed, as an airdrop within two months of the close. If you do not redeem in round one, you have no share in round two. What you receive is not BAL and does not resolve into BAL.
veBAL holders. You vote with the BAL underlying your lock, at face value. Round one opens at the end of May 2027, after every lock that exists today has expired. Your lock unlocks into 80/20 BAL/WETH BPT; the pool stays exitable, you exit to BAL and redeem. A lock extended after this post redeems when it unlocks, within the window or not at all.
BAL held through tetuBAL, sdBAL and auraBAL. sdBAL and auraBAL unwind before round one on their protocols’ own calendars; you exit to BAL and redeem directly, like any other holder. A position not unwound to BAL by the close of round one does not redeem. tetuBAL never becomes BAL. Your balance at the block of this post is what counts, and so is the BAL behind each tetuBAL at that block. When round one opens you receive half that much BAL from the treasury, and redeem it exactly like any other holder.
Partners with live pools or integrations. You hear from us directly. Migrate liquidity during the exit window; the withdrawals only date is 30 October 2026, and this proposal is the notice. Obligations are honored or wound down explicitly with you. Requests to carry a deployment or product forward go through their own Snapshot vote.
Bug bounty researchers. The program runs through the exit window and ends on 30 October 2026. A parallel proposal adjusts the critical cap before then. After that date the program no longer exists.
LPs affected by the attacks. Recovered funds are yours and stay outside this distribution. A separate BIP will propose how what remains unclaimed after the claim windows, and anything recovered later, is returned to you.
The team. Two months of notice, 27 August to 31 October, then a small hourly transition team through the distribution, coordinated by the OpCo. Everyone leaves with references and introductions from me, and public credit for what they built.
Costs
Baseline. Monthly burn today, all in: about $150k a month. Monthly protocol revenue: about $30k in August, down from $97k in June, most of it from v2. The treasury earns about $25k a month from how kpk manages it, and keeps earning through the winddown.
To 31 October. Spending runs under BIP-918 as approved. The notice period, contracts running normally, is about $300k (September + October), shown in the transparency reports so the full cost is visible. It is not part of this vote.
Winddown budget, from 1 November. $150k to May 2027, $30k from then to the final sweep, and a reserve of $220k drawn only if needed. Total $400k. It replaces the remaining BIP-918 allocation from 1 November.
It buys the minimal exit stack, documentation, permission cleanup, unlock support, both distribution rounds, the final sweep and the closure of the entities. Whatever is unspent goes into the distribution at the next round or the final sweep.
Offsets. Protocol revenue flows to the DAO until the pause; what arrives after it goes to round two. Cancelling the BIP-919 buyback releases whatever was earmarked for it into the distribution; superseding BIP-687 releases what remains of the earmark once coverage ends and open reports are resolved. Proceeds from anything the DAO owns beyond the treasury are not built in; anything realized is added.
The comparison. The winddown costs $400k and ends. Continuation costs the run rate above for as long as it runs. Whatever is not spent from the winddown budget goes back to BAL holders; money spent continuing does not come back.
Runway. The treasury, at least $9M estimated at current token prices, covers this budget with a margin. The argument is not that Balancer is running out, but that what remains belongs to holders and should reach them.
Governance path
The winddown is decided by token holders: forum post, discussion, Snapshot vote on the standard cadence. Voting power is raw BAL held or delegated on every chain where BAL is deployed, plus, on Ethereum, the BAL underlying 80/20 BAL/WETH BPT held directly or locked in veBAL, counted at face value (BIP-921). Positions excluded under BIP-924 carry no voting power. Quorum is 5M BAL (BIP-924).
One vote, plus a Snapshot vote for each transfer of what the DAO owns beyond the treasury. This proposal decides the package above, including every allocation rule of the distribution; the mechanism that implements it follows item 7. Anything that would change an allocation comes back to a vote.
Communication changes from this post. Winddown actions, including the pause, fee changes, permission revocations and any winddown related movement of funds, wait for the vote.
The Treasury Council controls the Treasury Safe and, under BIP-882, oversees distributions and liquidations proposed by the Foundation Directors and objects to what is not in the ecosystem’s interest. That mandate is oversight and signing, not a standing authority to distribute the treasury to holders. This vote authorizes the distribution. kpk manages the assets under the Treasury Council’s control; the Council supervises the opening snapshot and signs; the Foundation executes as agent of the DAO. The Foundation is therefore the last entity to close, after the distribution process ends. The Council remains the signer set until then; any change to its composition goes through governance, as it does today.
The DAO vote governs the protocol and the treasury. The legal entities execute their own closures under the law that governs them, consistent with the approved plan. Where that law diverges from the plan, the law wins and the divergence is reported to holders.
If this doesn’t pass
A “no” vote leaves the current framework in place: the BIP-918 mandate and its budget, the BIP-919 buyback on its schedule, the BIP-687 bounty, the contracts as they are.
To be clear about what the notice was: contributor contracts end on 31 October, and I gave that notice in August so people had time to look for other opportunities rather than find out with the vote. If holders reject this, contributors who want to carry on under the existing mandate can, and it is funded.
Contributors are working on a separate proposal to keep the infrastructure alive under a new name. That work is theirs, and I told them it has my support as a fork. It is posted on its own and decided on its own.
I will not front a continuation plan, and nothing here funds one. Any other direction comes through the same forum process, priced and staffed by whoever brings it, decided by the same holders. Where it needs a handover, the OpCo supports it in order: infrastructure, documentation, permissions and open obligations transferred, not dropped. This vote decides this proposal.
Disclosures
Contributors hold BAL from vesting granted before the April restructuring. BIP-918 contemplated new vesting for continuing contributors; it was never implemented. What has been distributed since relates to the earlier agreements. No new vesting or BAL grant to contributors is proposed here, and I redeem on the same terms as any other holder. I am paid through my notice period like everyone else.
I sit on the Treasury Council and on the multisigs that execute what governance approves, alongside other contributors. I was added to the Council under BIP-918. The Council signs what governance approves; it does not decide this.
The transition team is staffed within the winddown budget; whoever carries the recovery work after the entities close is named, with terms, in its own Snapshot vote. I am not claiming a place in either, and if I end up doing paid work in either it goes through the same approval as anyone else’s, published in the budget or in that vote. I stay available to the transition team either way. I remain on the Treasury Council as a signer until the process ends.
Before this post I told the Treasury Council and the largest holders what I was going to propose, so they could push back before it was public, and asked them not to trade on it. I am disclosing that this happened, not what was said. The proposal has to win in the open.
I author and publish this proposal. Where the DAO votes to transfer something it owns beyond the treasury, any counterparty relationship I have is disclosed in that vote.
Timeline
| When | What |
|---|---|
| 27 Aug 2026 | Contributor notice starts |
| 14 Sep 2026 | This proposal posted |
| 25–29 Sep 2026 | Snapshot vote |
| 30 Oct 2026 | Withdrawals only date: pausable pools paused, recovery mode where the contracts require it, protocol fee to zero on the rest where allowed, bug bounty coverage ends |
| 31 Oct 2026 | Notice ends. From 1 November: transition team, minimal exit stack, winddown budget |
| Nov–Dec 2026 | Low risk permission revocations |
| End Feb 2027 | Implementation specification published for comment |
| Before round one | Claim contract audited. Opening snapshot block announced at least two weeks ahead |
| End May 2027 | Round one opens; opening snapshot taken: BAL burned, bulk of the treasury distributed in kind. Unlock related permissions retired after that |
| End Nov 2027 | Round one closes. The record of who redeemed and how much is final |
| End Jan 2028 | Round two airdrop to the addresses that redeemed: unspent budget, later arrivals, unredeemed share |
| End Jul 2028 | Final sweep: whatever has arrived is distributed to the same addresses. The process ends |
| After that | Treasury and distribution control retired. Entity closures complete |