I see a strong bias in this proposal away from veBAL blackholes being the primary source of value extraction for a protocol building on top of veBAL tokenomics. I think that’s healthy for the ecosystem. I think that’s a good bias for BalancerDAO to have.
Do you have a suggestion for what you think a good final solution should be and why? Do you agree that there is some level at which too many of the emissions are just being fed back onto stakers for staking BAL instead of participating in the rest of the AMM ecosystem? What do you think a reasonable maximum is, and how do you think the best way to divide that up between various wrappers and veBAL itself is? I think this thread gives us the chance to discuss that that and I suppose it’s up to Bobby if he wants to make changes and if/when what ends up written here goes to snapshot.
It seems to be policy, at least for now, that anyone can bring any properly structured governance to vote when they wish. I tend to agree that Balancer governance needs more process and checks and balances.
Do you have any proposal for the “formal” process" a decision like this should go through, and how it should be decided if and what goes to snapshot? You seem to think about these things a lot, and IMO Balancer governance could use some work/development in this regard. I would love to see a conversation and eventually a BIP about that.
In terms of this matter, is what you’re asking for the ability to vote between one of a number of options as I suggested above? I think in the end that’s up to Bobby, at least that seems to be precedent. Do you want to revisit, simplify and relax the caps laid out in BIP-57? I also think that would be a good idea sometime soon and would be happy to work together with you on another governance proposal around that.
DM me if you want to work on co-authoring some governance.