There was never a rule established that once a gauge is approved it would run in perpetuity. This is factually incorrect.
5 Likes
I was mainly analyzing in the context of an alleged fiduciary relationship.
I agree this situation is fraught with potential issues.
Your analysis seems to be based on the assumption that once approved, a gauge continues in perpetuity. Im not aware of anything in any of the initial veBAL or gauge proposals or approvals that would support that conclusion.
And itâs not like the investment in veBAL is lost. The ability to vote on gauges still exists.
The maintenance of gauges is simply subject to future governance.
That all being said, it would be worth an analysis to go back through initial veBAL and gauge implementations to help establish what a reasonable expectation would actually be.
As others have mentioned and recommended, itâs also worth doing a few other things, like trying to have a dialogue with the main CREAM/ETH and veBAL stakeholder. And working out objective standards, approved by governance, for governing and, if needed, killing gauges in a non-emergency manner.
1 Like
The proposal mentions only the Curve Mochi pool case, which was a clear governance attack and has frankly nothing to do with the CREAM/WETH situation
The more I look into this the more it feels like an attack (i.e. A Story of Machi Big Brother | Medium). I canât readily figure out what would prevent a mint of millions more CREAM tokens by an insider should the CREAM/WETH market pick up momentum due to the current APR. The Emergency DAO should kill this immediately to prevent further damage.
1 Like
Mikey, the emergency subDAO is a subDAO, which is a group of people that execute the killing of the gauge through a multisig.
The emergency subDAO establishment was approved to protect from fraudulent activity or potential loss of funds. Voters were lead to believe that these were the only two reasons why the Emergency subDAO was supposed to exist. There is no mention in the proposal that the Emergency subDAO can kill any pool for any reasons outside of those two premises. That is my point. In my opinion, the Emergency subDAO has no authority to kill the gauge unless we change the rules.
You are free to think and act as you better see fit, but eagle is the only law professor in this thread. For your protection please consider legal counselling. All this, really, is not worth any further discussion unless we are all sure we are working within a robust legal framework.
You are right, but I would also argue that there has never been any discussion around the killing of a gauge for lack of financial performance. Where do we draw the line here? What metrics do we use? How do we give investors confidence that if they come and buy 10M$ worth of veBAL to incentivise their pool, we wonât kill their gauge just because its failing to gain traction?
If, letâs say Prime, decided to buy and lock 10M$ worth of BAL to incentivise their pool, would we also kill the gauge if trading activity was not satisfactory? Would you consider it fair?
This is also my concern in all honesty. And the general alignment among the different players makes me uncomfortable. I bumped into the Aura newsletter this morning and read the last few lines:
potential for another CREAM style governance attack that oes not provide sufficient fees for the Balancer ecosystem.
This line already tells me that Aura consider CREAM a governance attack by not generating enough fees (how does that make sense?). I expect them to vote for the killing (this will also benefit them, directly or indirectly) and bring forward a coordinated attack. Am I wrong? maybe. But what ifâŚ
2 Likes
That is precisely why there is a proposal that is going to vote on this topic instead of the Emergency DAO acting unilaterally.
We are having that discussion right now and itâs not purely for financial performance â as mentioned multiple times by many folks, there are other reasons to reflect on the CREAM gauge.
5 Likes
And this proposal gives the emergency subdao approval to kill the gauge. The point of governance is to be iterative and its mindblowing to me that you are suggesting taking power away from veBAL holders. If we want to lock out a function from being accessible from governance, we could do that on a contract level. If there are any other areas of the protocol you donât think veBAL holders should have control over I suggest making a proposal to freeze the parameters in place.
Regardless, I think theres a lot of context you are missing, as it has never just been about the lack of fees. As far as ve systems, directing emissions to a gauge you solo farm is the classic governance attack.
2 Likes
Ok so now is not a lack of fees issue but a governance issue. I mean guys, at least coordinate internally first, build a case and present it to the community then. English is not my first language and I might read âAâ while it means âDâ, but the forum proposal to me refers to revenue concerns only:
I believe we are going in circle here. I raised my concerns clearly but there seems to be a general lack of valid counter-arguments and not clear answers to what really matters. Iâm sorry but it all feels very amateurish.
2 Likes
It really looks to me the conversation is going in circles, as well.
So, taken that governance (veBAL) has the power over gauges activity, as (per contract) it can be killed/enabled; and approved gauges were delegated to Balancer DAO here. Would it help reach middle ground if the gauge were to be killed by the same multisig instead of the Emergency subDAO?
2 Likes
I am not coordinating with anyone when posting my forum responses. They are solely my opinion, so I donât have to coordinate with anyone to post it. I understand that you are not a fan of the veBAL system, which is totally fine as you havenât really made that a secret. However, please try to keep your contributions constructive instead of trying to burn everything down to prove a point.
Itâs pretty clear that someone solo farming a gauge that they direct to themselves is a bad thing in ve systems. Thatâs sort of the whole point of the gauge approval process. Many ve systems have suffered greatly because of this, particularly solidly (who remembers BATMAN token). Why wouldnât we learn from those mistakes and try to build gauge guidelines that prevent this sort of activity from happening again? Are you really insisting that we fall on the sword because a bad gauge slipped through the cracks?
Youâve made your point. Vote against the proposal if you donât want it to pass.
2 Likes
Hi. Trantor here, I wrote the newsletter. I just wanted to make sure that what I wrote in the newsletter is not misconstrued. For each of the BIP and the AIP I was attempting to provide a summary of what the discussions were on the forum, I was not seeking to provide a value judgement. Aura does not have an official position on that BIP, the newsletter was just a summary of the discussions. If that is not what came across then I apologize and welcome feedback on how to improve them. I was reluctant not to provide a summary as then it just became kind of useless information for the community. What I wrote reads: BIP 270- Proposes a DIGG/wBTC/graviAURA pool from Badger DAO in a 40/40/20 format. This proposal was very close and was approved with only a very small margin. DIGG holders and Badger DAO were in support of the proposal and sought to have it included as a tool for graviAURA experimentation and BTC aligned trading, whilst opponents were concerned about the potential for another CREAM style governance attack that does not provide sufficient fees for the Balancer ecosystem. (to my mind that reads as a summary and for full disclosure I have some cream in the LP)
10 Likes
Small update - thanks to the feedback from Andrea & Eaglex the specification has been updated to reflect execution of this proposal by the DAO Multisig, not the Emergency subDAO.
cheers
8 Likes
Just to clarify what a contractual agreement is in this context. You donât need to have a written deed of course. The documents concerning the BAL token explain the functioning etc. They donât tell that a gauge can be killed. Therefore such a behavior may infringe the expecations of the investors which relied on certain use cases concerning the tokens that Balancer has issued. This may potentially make the issuers/founders/core contributors to the project/people that retain decision making power liable. Again, the tokens offer utility and governance rights to the holders: this is the contractual agreement, which with the killing of the gauge might be infringed. Thatâs it. No more words on the issue.
1 Like
Iâll be voting in support of killing the gauge, however, I do think a more defined process for when to kill a gauge in the future should be implemented. Iâm not sure if that is based on fee generation compared to bal incentives as a threshold ratio or a certain percentage of bal emissions outright but itâd should be defined - if only as a social pressure/framework.
4 Likes
Cream is not the issue here.
Being a majority investor & optimizing/recouping our losing investment is the issue.
The fair way to reduce impact of a whale is for other whales to gulp BAL & Lock. Any takers?
A point adversaries omit : We are missionary liquidity mining BAL token, not 1 BAL sold, all adds proportionally balanced.
Canât say same for other mercenary miners. Example from Gnosis: Active Treasury Management
Awaiting more analytics!
In not too distant future, ,the auraGalaxy (Aura, graviAura, AuraBal) is going to capture around 50% of BAL rewards. Will that be acceptable? even when fees cannot remotely compensate?
Opening the pandora box of killings, well cue boomerang effect.
6 Likes
The difference between AURA and a single large HODLer, is that AURA is just enabling smaller players to farm BAL like a whale, and is allowing DAOâs to access voting without having to manage long locks. This unlocks value.
Just like in Curve/Conve, Aura is a collective endeavour, not a single entity. In the end the vote weight and boost locked auraBAL is controlled by AURA which is pretty widely distributed.
What is important to me for this ecosystem, is that the tokens continue to flow to a wide number of HODLers and more people are enticed to join/invest somehow.
If you could change your voting on pools you control a bit, and focus on controlling say not more than 50% of any given pool, and maybe spreading out your voting such that none were getting more than 10% of veBAL, in my mind it would help a lot/ be a good start.
If you could buy into the AURA concept, which is a proven way to increase the value of a ve Ecosystem, then graviAURA presents you with a good way to farm and make yields in a more holistic way.
The graviAURA/auraBAL/ETH LP gives you a great way to farm with all your rewards. At the same time, a bit of sell pressure on AURA right now is nice as the market needs more float. So donât feel bad selling excess. Over time you can move your investment there, and come up with a more liquid version that can allow you exit in a smart way as you wish. In the end we want DAOs to be paying you for votes to help them build and allow for innovation. Thatâs the whole idea.
Further, bribes on hidden hands will be ramping up quite a bit soon. Maybe you could accept a little less of a total ROI on your investment in order to vote for some of the essential pools that help the DAO grow like the aave USD pool and/or stETH and/or support some pools on side-chains?
It is great to see you in this ecosystem, but we will all make more money if we create something sustainable that welcomes new people in. Right now seeing 30% of veBAL voting for CREAM is a potential detractor for many large investors. It makes balancer look not serious or big league.
I also do not support killing this gauge right now. The largest complaint I have is that the fees are not managed by the DAO. That being said, in the next months we do need to find a way to change the makeup of yield flows in the ecosystem a bit.
You invested in an ecosystem, help it grow!
You know where to find me if you want to talk more. Showing the willingness to try new things and give way a bit would change this whole conversation a lot. As would supporting/accepting Aura, which I think has very very strong support in the rest of the Balancer community.
3 Likes
This March 31, 2022 post from @solarcurve in BAL Gauges and specifically its final statement seem to definitively address this point - any approved gauge can be killed at any time through the regular governance voting process.
1 Like
It is for me. CREAM is a governance token of a semi-abandoned fork of Compound fired up by a serial pump-and-dump token creator who found a creative way to extract some value from this otherwise rubbish coin.
2 Likes