Apologies for not publicly commenting on this, which I can imagine must look strange given this is a very big governance change.
Myself and the other Maxis have worked closely with Tritium on this, tested out the processes outlined, etc.
Bit of historical context for folks might also be helpful. Back in the day it was decided to decentralize Balancer governance and allow the community to post proposals on snapshot. This prompted me to draft “Governance Process Revamp”, which created the Governance Council (GC). Included was a requirement that the community must reach “soft consensus” before a proposal could go to a vote.
Some time later it was realized the community might not always agree on something and a few determined ppl can give the appearance that soft consensus was not reached, or at least make it very difficult to come to an objective conclusion on whether it has been reached. This prompted me to draft “Governance Process Revamp 2.0” which removed the requirement of “soft consensus”, effectively opening the door for anyone to propose anything (that Balancer governance has the power to implement) and have it go to a vote.
This has led to some famously contentious proposals going to a vote which would have otherwise been blocked by lack of “soft consensus”. I would argue it’s very important to the value proposition of veBAL that nothing can stop a proposal that can be implemented from going to a vote. Only by voting can we truly know what veBAL voters support and that’s the only way to move forward as an ecosystem. Contentious issues inevitably will arise and they must be resolved by a vote. This is the sanctity of Balancer governance that has to be protected.
Despite the lack of any decision making authority on the part of the GC there remains a perception that the GC controls governance. BIP-163 removes that perception by dissolving the GC and replacing it with a threshold of 200k veBAL, which someone must own outright or have delegated to them in order to post snapshot proposals.
The fact that only proposals which Balancer governance has the capability to implement are valid is not changing and cannot change. Yes, someone could start a vote where this is not the case and it could pass - however, nothing would happen and nothing would be implemented.
The Maxis will fill the role of “verifier of last resort” to ensure Balancer’s governance process can continue to operate without any impediments. Many people who make proposals would not have the technical knowledge to write a correct specification and I believe that should not be a blocker the community has to deal with. In the case that a proposer cannot write the specification themselves the Maxis will step in to help and verify its accuracy. Obviously if a proposer can do this themselves all the better, and Maxis will simply verify its accuracy.
Functionally I would argue this BIP changes nothing, aside from putting forward some processes we believe are useful in a fully decentralized governance system. Today anyone can propose anything that Balancer governance has power to implement and it will go to a vote. After this BIP passes that will still be the case. Only difference is the GC disappears which is a very good thing as it removes any appearance of governance control by the Maxis, which could not be further from the truth. Maxis have virtually zero governance control as our entire voting stakes are delegated to us by other veBAL holders and can be rugged at anytime. We have zero decision making authority on what goes to a vote and we have never had such authority.
“Always has been”