For the record, I am not attacking your character but instead making sure some very important disclosures are public. With all due respect, I don’t know you, you are new and the first thing I see you doing is shilling a horribly defined proposal. I have the right to ask questions on behalf of the community (I know for a fact I am not the only one wondering this). I appreciate you responding on that point, don’t take it personally.
I proposed to the Governance Council that this proposal was well defined and could proceed to a vote per Snapshot
The other members of the council (zekraken, Xeonus) voted no due to an unclear Risks section and a general lack of detail in the proposal. Mike abstained - thus making it impossible to reach a majority in favor. So this proposal is the first in our history to be blocked by the Governance Council 
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What about allocating BAL to bribe TOKE voters to vote for their specified assets to be deployed to Balancer? Currently the only other options are Uni, Curve, and Sushi which as far as I know are all not bribing for this part of the vote. Therefore, wouldn’t we be able to really easily come in and influence the DEX that liquidity is being directed to? Is my understanding of everything correct?
Perhaps this might mean creating a pool on the Balancer side for assets that no pool yet exists for. i.e. frax/weth
It does seem like there is definitely some potential benefit from getting involved with Tokemak but I don’t see this proposal actually accomplishing what it states to do.
Edit: Also I wrote this message in the discord, which I feel is valuable enough to post here
Considering the fact that having a BAL CORE will do nothing to allow us to direct liquidity, the only thing that it allows us as a treasury to do is farm TOKE using BAL. but since the part about farming BAL is not part of the proposal, can you really say this proposal results in us being able to direct liquidity?
If the point of this proposal is to “direct liquidity to balancer”, this proposal does not let us do that. Which is fine, but this must be explicitly discussed as to what the implications of the vote are. Basically it would be nice if the whole picture was considered in the main proposal.
For example, one risk would be this vote passes, we get a core reactor, then the vote to deploy BAL to the CORE could fail, meaning we got very little benefit from the first proposal passing and no way to recover the BAL used to bribe.
I think this is part of why many consider this proposal to be incomplete. The stated goals are not accomplished by nature of passing this proposal. And that’s ok, but I think the proposal should clearly lay all of this info out.
I do see how this could have relevance on the proposal, however I don’t see how how bribing people to get a reactor set up for BAL helps solve this problem. In order to fix that problem we would need LDs to act in our favor. I’m still not sure if I understand how a BAL reactor generates TVL for us. I think what it does is gives projects a pairing so their token has deeper trading liquidity. I don’t think BAL needs that.
ultimately if this proposal is trying to get a reactor set up to farm TOKE so we can use that TOKE to direct liquidity that is fine, but i don’t see that spelled out here. How long would it take to have real power to influence TVL of any size? at the same time couldn’t you also cut out the middle man and just market buy TOKE rather than giving it away to people that are likely to sell?
To be honest, after reading all the discussions, I don’t think this proposal convinces me, so if a vote is launched, I will vote No. Would like to see further information on how much we can benefit from joining this Bribe, If it’s just to get liquidity, why don’t we swap TOKE directly and vote to guide liquidity? Maybe I don’t understand in depth, I hope there are more detailed info to make the right decision.
BTW, I think that reasonable questioning is beneficial to Balancer, and should not bring personal emotions. We are all stakeholders. If there is enough information to prove that this proposal is beneficial to the development of Balancer, there is no reason not to support it.
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they won’t do a treasury swap with us unless we win a Reactor. We could sell BAL for TOKE on the open market but that creates unnecessary sell pressure to me and is bad practice for us in general. Bribing does carry a cost but if we win more BAL than we spent on the bribe would be sucked into the Reactor so net there is no sell pressure created (and probably net buy pressure). Then we can determine if we want to do a treasury swap (best choice to me) or farm with some amount of treasury BAL.
I think most of the BAL used for bribe will also be sold in the market. From this point of view, compared with buying TOKE with BAL, the selling pressure is the same, but in the latter way, we can use a smaller BAL quota to try, and the purchased TOKE is still asset in the treasury.
Of course, if we can win more BAL than we spent on the bribe, that will be good, but we need more detailed analysis and evidence to show how we achieve this result, how long it will take to achieve it, and what the possible risks are
I will post a counter proposal that will likely address all questions and concerns here.
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First of all: thank you all for the discussions - we are all very passionate about BAL. That is great!
I am trying to put it as objectively as possible as I was also signaling that this proposal is unfit for a vote. Why? Because in all current discussions my questions at the top of this thread have yet to be answered. They are essential to make an educated vote. Otherwise (I feel) we still don’t have any idea what we are exactly voting for.
For this proposal or any counter proposal to be considered to be “fit for a vote” we need clarity as follows:
Specification
- What does the token swap / bribe try to achieve?
- How will the protocol benefit from this bribe?
- Why do we need a reactor?
- What is the long term incentive for BAL holders when committing to swapping / bribing $2M BAL
Context example:
Your quote does not help in assessing the situation and does not answer any questions adequately. Please be more specific in a counter-proposal. “Subsequent partnership benefits” are as vague as it can get.
Risk Assessment
- Describe with Impact / Likelihood possible scenarios for market conditions and compare other protocol actions
- Describe how good and bad market conditions / Toke price action can impact this deal
- Describe the likelihood that the bribe fails and therefore what happens with allocated funds
- etc
Context example:
This is only one part of the risk assessment and a very obvious one. In retrospect look at the recent FUSE exploits. We need a risk assessment on a tokenomic level.
I hope these inputs help in defining a better to understand counter proposal.
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