# \[BIP-67\] Enable rETH/RPL Gauge \[Ethereum\] **URL:** https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-67-enable-reth-rpl-gauge-ethereum/3725 **Category:** BAL Gauges **Created:** [September 9, 2022, 3:15pm UTC](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-67-enable-reth-rpl-gauge-ethereum/3725 "2022-09-09T15:15:03Z") **Posts on this page:** 1 **Showing post:** 3
### Author: ![0xMaha](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex027/user_avatar/forum.balancer.fi/0xmaha/32/1795_2.png) [@0xMaha](https://forum.balancer.fi/u/0xMaha) #### Post date: [September 11, 2022, 2:47pm UTC](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-67-enable-reth-rpl-gauge-ethereum/3725/3 "2022-09-11T14:47:52Z")
> [@solarcurve](#): > > In addition, any RPL collected by the `ProtocolFeeCollector` would also be directed towards bribing on this pool. We currently have ~$60k RPL in the fee collector which Balancer can use to bootstrap initial TVL, thus kick starting the flywheel here. I support an rETH/RPL gauge for the reasons mentioned, but having a re-allocation of system revenue as a side-note to an otherwise standard gauge proposal should have more visibility. Given that there are 10 BIP’s up for vote this week, it’s tough to expect people to dig in to each proposal and think critically about them. This proposal would see a big chunk of existing/future system revenue sourced from other RPL pools directed from veBAL to core pools bribes, which is something material that should be highlighted in the proposal title and discussed IMO. For reference, the original [core pools proposal](https://snapshot.org/#/balancer.eth/proposal/0x28bd2c5580f5a8effacdceb0aec52e9bc63987fa4f4a39f8b8223257ca4376cc) had the following: “All fees earned by Ethereum core pools would be used as bribes on those pools (each pool gets its own fees as a bribe), after the DAO takes its 25%. All fees earned by Ethereum non-core pools continue to be sent to veBAL and the DAO (75/25 split) as they are today.” --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-67-enable-reth-rpl-gauge-ethereum/3725)._