[BIP-19] Incentivize Core Pools & L2 Usage

Thinking further on this, I think the proposal adds too much complexity to a system already non-trivial to understand. I think we need to wait longer to see how all the various lockers etc being built on top of Balancer impact vote distribution.

A much better alternative I think for the short-mid term is that Balancer’s treasury locks some % of its BAL into veBAL and uses that to vote for core I suppose “public goods” pools each week. That way we don’t radically alter the system’s function before we’ve seen how all the moving parts interact outside of somewhere like Curve, where there are only really Stablepools.


I’m in favor of the core pools proposal. In a bear market, the priority of Balancer should be to earn as much capital as possible while minimizing dilution.

Farmers such as CREAM incentivize their LPs only to dump the farmer BAL on the community as well as use the LP for exit liquidity. In this model, as projects like CREAM continue to sell their token, the TVL of Balancer also falls. If veBAL is to retain value over its locking periods, it’s best to minimize the vulture capital.

Promoting healthy pools, with heavy trading fees, that earn yield-baring tokens for the DAO, is the ideal model for Balancer’s future. Having pools that are heavily traded also brings more users, brings LPs with less IL that people want to farm (boosts TVL), and earns more for the DAO, which is most important.

Redacted Cartel & Hidden Hand Marketplace have shown to be great partners and have consistently held all of their CRV/CVX even through the toughest markets. They have also proved they are willing to dedicate resources to building on top of protocols with Pirex (Liquid Wrappers & Auto Compounding) & Hidden Hand (Bribe Market & Delegation Platform). I think they are a great partner more innovation and users to the Balancer platform.

This proposal turns BAL into one of the best value accruing projects in DeFi.



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I think a challenge here is that it works well for re-enforcing rewards for existing pools which are doing well for the protocol, but makes it harder for newly added pools to reach that stage. The other thing is whether there are core pools which don’t generate as much in fees but are good to have for other reasons, like e.g. being able to route trades through the Balancer vault without having to go via other sources of liquidity elsewhere.

At the moment a major issue I can see is that we no longer have any liquidity really in pools which are important in swaps, so e.g. a common trade may be USD > [token], we have ETH > [token] liquidity but lack USD > ETH liquidity, limiting the usefulness of liquidity in the vault. It might be that it’s decided not to be important, but the entire previous system designed by governance and managed by the liquidity mining committee was built around that.


How long should we anticipate implementing this BIP would take? A couple days, weeks or months to go live post passing vote? Thanks

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if this passes the first bribes would land on July 11th, lining up with Aura’s voting cycle


No wBTC containing core pools on mainnet?

once the new pool factories are completed to allow for taking the protocol fee on yield bearing tokens I can see the creation of a core pool like wstETH/wbtc or wstETH/bbaUSD/wbtc


Did I read correctly new pool factories are not imminent though? Still at least 1-2 months out if everything goes according to plan? Not sure if I got that piece correct. Thx

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correct, that is the latest estimate I believe.

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Happy to see L2 usage included as part of these proposals!