While I agree that these changes move the Balancer ecosystem more towards a decentralized model which is the ultimate goal I am a bit worried that there could be a few actors in the future that may look to take advantage of the system that will be put into place. I share some of the same thoughts as @Mike_B. I am however glad to see that funding will be limited to quarterly tranches because that was unclear to me, I was thinking SPs could ask for up to 1 year.
I also agree on the “Accountability Committee” idea, that they shouldn’t have the power to act without governance approval, but I do feel the responsibility will fall upon certain individuals to call out SPs for not acting according to their mandates. If they don’t act many quarters of less desirable outcomes will persist. My gut feeling is that there should be some form of “steering committee” that helps move everything, in the right direction and package information until the initial framework/SPs are in place (veBAL still formally deciding), then that committee gets dissolved (not sure what timing would be right though).
some examples without filtering noise:
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what is multiple SPs request to do the same work at the same time, it’s mention above overlap should be kept to a minimum but who enforces this? the voters?
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what if a new SP comes in and wants to undercut another SPs price for the same, do both proposals go up? does the existing SP get any credit for work done? voters are supposed to know all that?
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SP wants to work on implementing something, some new features, but needs Blabs to work on it, but Blabs doesn’t have the time, however that SP is funded because voters don’t know that until after the vote passes
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SPs making a very well thought out proposal with what ends up being unrealistic goals (taking on too much at one time), getting paid a lot and not being able to deliver, and it is more that this will be spread out of a much longer timeframe, but this happens a few quarters until someone wises up
It just seems that we are moving from a semi-rigid framework to something that is pretty wide open. My fear isn’t for tomorrow it is for months from now, and while it is nice to think that all SPs and voters have the best intentions i’d hate to see something slip through that rekts the ecosystem. I don’t yet know all the costs associated to spinning up this model, but I keep asking about it because BAL is just coming off all time lows and nobody knows when the bear market will end.
I don’t want to sound like an alarmist and I admit I am not an expert with DAO frameworks, however I did want to write a little about how I was feeling. I do like the idea about trying to lock in an annual budget, but without ever going through this exercise i’m not sure if i’d or anyone would know the appropriate value.
last thing, in terms of quorum for voting, should one address ever be able to pass a vote on its own? i know people could split their veBAL across multiple wallets but i’m wondering if it makes sense to have quorum some % above the largest holder or top 5 address or something.